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A b strac t
This paper analyses the interdependence of political and economic manipulations 
by the government in an opportunistic political business cycle (PBC) model. The 
government has two instruments to improve re-election chances: (i) debt-financed 
transfers; and (ii) propaganda (disinformation) to influence the perception of unin­
formed voters. Our main finding implies that countries with dispersed realisations for 
government competence (typical in developing countries) can reduce the budget cycle 
by increasing the share of informed votes. However, in (developed) countries with less 
variable government competence, increasing the information level of citizens may even 
exacerbate the problem of political budget cycles.
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1 Introduction
The recurring coincidence of elections and the business cycle has captivated economists’ 
minds for at least 35 years. Empirical evidence and theoretical developments led the way 
from adaptive expectations money-induced political business cycle (PBC) models in the 
1970s to rational expectations budget cycle models in the 1990s and thereafter.1 The idea 
is always the same: the incumbent government tries to improve its re-election chances by 
politically motivated short-term  economic boosts. Among other explanations, government 
competence is used to explain why rational agents can be fooled by economic manipulations. 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) introduce the concept of competency with an instrum ental defi­
nition: the more competent a government, the less revenue is needed for providing a given 
level of public services. In their model, the government can signal higher competence to 
all voters by its choice of economic policy and can, thereby, improve its re-election chances, 
because rational agents prefer higher competence. In Shi and Svensson (2006), only the 
uninformed voters must be convinced of high government competence by an increased level 
of expenditures. In both  model types, voters, even if uninformed as in Shi and Svensson
(2006), form rational expectations about (private agents’ perception of) the government’s 
budgetary policy.
This paper introduces disinformation (or, synonymously, propaganda)2 as an additional, 
a political instrum ent of government policy. It is now disinformation by the government, 
which is used for explaining private agents’ perception of the government’s budgetary policy.
1 The PBC literature was spurred by Nordhaus’s (1975) idea that monetary policy could be used to 
stimulate aggregate demand prior to an election in order to improve re-election chances. Drazen (2001) 
offers a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical PBC literature. Summary evidence quoted 
by him does not support the notion of a monetary policy-induced business cycle (confirmed also in studies 
by Alt and Crystal, 1983, and Faust and Irons, 1999). Instead, the evidence points towards cycles of debt 
(confirmed also by Alesina et al., 1992 and 1993, and Alesina and Roubini, 1990) and public expenditures 
and, particularly, transfers (confirmed also by Block, 2002, Schuknecht, 1996 and 2000, Shi and Svensson, 
2006, and Vergne, 2009).
2 Disinformation is not just misinformation, i.e. incorrect information. Instead, disinformation can 
be defined as the deliberate and malicious dissemination of false or misleading information. The term 
propaganda has a slightly different meaning and is typically preferred when the purpose of influencing a 
large number of people is stressed. Nonetheless, this paper uses the terms disinformation and propaganda 
synonymously.
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Thus, we replace (and move beyond) the rational expectations assumption by specifying a 
second government instrum ent. It seems plausible th a t a government, which is willing 
to manipulate the whole economy, would a fortiori also be willing to disseminate false or 
misleading information.3 This seems a straightforward assumption for many developing 
countries where an underdeveloped press culture and censorship go hand in hand with 
propaganda, but even industrial countries use disinformation about government finances. 
There is quite a bit of anecdotal evidence in economic history.4 In a rigorous econometric 
study, Heinemann (2006) substantiates the claim th a t governments are particularly keen 
on manipulating information prior to elections. He finds evidence th a t Germany’s fiscal 
forecasts from 1969 to 2003, especially for the deficit, were particularly optimistic in election 
year’s.
Giving the government a second instrum ent, i.e. a disinformation technology, affects the 
politically induced cycle and changes the role of competence relative to results previously 
obtained. Note th a t it is throughout assumed in the literature th a t both  voters and the 
government observe the competence distribution, but not necessarily the actual level of com­
petence. Furthermore, models are based on different forms of informational asymmetries. 
In Rogoff and Sibert (1988), where the actual competence level is known to the incumbent, 
but not to voters prior to decision-making, competence has a hump-shaped effect on the 
cycle. This means th a t an incumbent government with a low level of competence chooses to 
manipulate the economy by little, with increasing levels of competence by more, but with 
high levels, again, by less. In Shi and Svensson (2006), where competence is not known 
to either the government or to informed or uninformed voters, competence has no effect at
3 Nonetheless, disinformation has not received any attention in the PBC literature thus far. This is 
surprising for three reasons: (i) the economics of information being a well-established branch of economics; 
(ii) disinformation playing a role in the literature of political games (confer p.5); and (iii) the advances made 
in political economy, public choice, and behavioural economics, where outcomes often crucially depend on 
the quality of the information received.
4 For instance, Porritt (1910) reports ’’budget propaganda” in early twentieth century England, and 
Mitchell (1991) claims that the 1990 US budget ’ relied heavily on accounting gimmicks to make 1990 
spending appear lower than it really was.” To fulfill the Maastricht Criteria, some European countries 
managed to disguise information and falsify deficit figures prior to the start of the European Monetary 
Union, for instance by using hidden accounts and/or obscuring social security debt.
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all on the government’s optimal choice for its manipulations. In their model, capturing the 
distribution of government competence is, nonetheless, crucial for the result th a t a cycle 
obtains and th a t the cycle unambiguously increases with the share of uninformed voters.
This paper supposes th a t the actual competence level is not known to anybody, thus parallel­
ing the assumption made by Shi and Svensson (2006). Whereas actual competence m atters 
for the government’s optimal policy choice to m anipulate voters in Rogoff and Sibert (1988), 
here the distribution of competence affects the impact of changing the share of uninformed 
voters on government manipulations. This is so because the competence distribution deter­
mines how effective manipulations are in increasing the government’s re-election chances. 
Note th a t the purpose of appearing more competent is th a t private agents will vote for the 
incumbent, even if she is less competent than  her challenger. Consider now the probability 
mass of realisations for government competence th a t could make the government appear 
more competent than  the challenger due to manipulations. If the competence probability 
density function is steeply positive at the equilibrium, this probability mass is small (relative 
to the case of a flat density function). As shown in this paper, marginally increasing the 
share of voters who are uninformed about the deficit has a perverse effect on government 
manipulations, if the density function is sufficiently steep at the equilibrium. Increasing the 
share of voters who are uninformed about the deficit makes government manipulations more 
effective, in principle, because more people can be fooled. Nonetheless, manipulations may 
be reduced, because the marginal advantage for appearing more competent can be smaller 
(when the density function is steep at the equilibrium) than  the marginal costs of the ad­
ditional manipulations. For a bell-shaped density function, this may happen when most of 
the probability mass is close to average competence (the density function is compressed).
Our main result is in clear contrast to the unambiguous result by Shi and Svensson (2006) 
who find th a t raising the share of uninformed voters always increases the political budget 
cycle. In our model, an increase in uninformed voters does not necessarily lead to a larger 
cycle, if the incumbent knows th a t her competence level is probably close to average, i.e. 
potential realisations of government competence are not spread out over a large range of
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values. This implies th a t countries with dispersed realisations for government competence 
(typical in developing countries) can reduce the budget cycle by increasing the share of in­
formed votes. However, in (developed) countries with less variable government competence, 
increasing the information level of citizens may even exacerbate the problem of political 
budget cycles.
Elements of several literatures and methodologies are merged in this paper. First, the 
groundwork for a theory of the political budget cycle was laid by Rogoff (1990). He also 
criticises the traditional PBC literature by pointing out th a t rational voters should not let 
their expectations about post-election performance be influenced by pre-election budgets. 
In his paper, the voting outcome is, more plausibly, modelled as a function of voters’ expec­
tations about the candidates’ performance after elections. Our paper (as well as Shi and 
Svensson, 2006) deviate, however, in assuming tha t the government does not know for sure 
its own competence prior to decision taking. We also abandon modelling public goods as 
in Rogoff (1990) and in Shi and Svensson (2006) and capture government manipulations in 
terms of transfers (and debt) instead, thus following more closely Drazen’s (2001) empirical 
findings. Second, there is a (small) literature of disinformation in political economy games: 
propaganda is used to affect agents’ perception and thus the probability of appropriating a 
given rent.5 There and here, a disinformation technology is drawn upon and probabilistic 
voting is applied to determine the optimal investment in disinformation. In this paper, 
disinformation is used for explaining the perception of the deficit level by uninformed vot­
ers. Third, there is a growing literature of behavioural macroeconomics. We incorporate 
elements of near-rational behaviour as suggested by Akerlof and Yellen (1985)6 or Mankiw 
and Reis (2002). There is no reason why near-rational behaviour should remain confined to 
the economic realm .7 Assuming th a t a share of the electorate is uninformed is interpreted
5 In Austen-Smith (1987), candidates use campaign expenditures to affect their perceived position. Ur­
sprung (1994) models a propaganda campaign by competing interest groups.
6 They define near-rational behaviour as ’behavior that is perhaps suboptimal but that nevertheless 
imposes very small individual losses on its practitioners [i.e. individual agents] relative to the consequences 
of their first-best policy. ... [It] can nevertheless cause first-order changes in real activity [i.e. in the 
aggregate]”.
7 If some agents take their economic decision in a near-rational way, they should a fortiori take their
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as near-rationality on the part of the voters. Individual near-rationality has macroeconomic 
implications because policymakers count on the mistakes made by individuals. The govern­
ment will be tem pted to m anipulate uninformed voters by increasing government spending 
and, thereby, producing a deficit cycle. However, individual near-rationality also affects the 
formation of individuals’ expectations. In particular, near-rationality thwarts the rational 
expectations hypothesis.8
The remainder of the paper is built around 2 stages. The basic model of sections 2 and 3 
links this paper to the previous PBC literature and serves as benchmark for the extended 
model of sections 4 and 5. Section 2 presents a model without disinformation and with 
the rational expectations assumption preserved. The setup is similar to the one in Shi and 
Svensson (2006), but much simpler and with the focus on intertem poral transfers rather than  
public goods.9 Section 3 lays out the results of probabilistic voting. It is shown th a t the logic 
of the Shi and Svensson model carries over to this model, which means th a t transfer (in our 
model) and deficit cycles emerge. In section 4, we introduce a disinformation technology to 
explain the perception of voters who are uninformed about the level of deficit manipulations 
in a non-rational expectations setting. By doing so, we give the government an additional 
instrum ent and also consider additional groups of voters (informed and uninformed with 
respect to the propaganda instrum ent). Results and the role of the competence distribution 
are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the findings, some notes 
on policy implications and empirical relevance, and suggestions for future research.
political decisions in a near-rational way. In fact, the impact of an individual agent’s vote is limited, and 
the incentive to get informed is small. Caplan (2002, 2006) documents that it is not surprising that agents 
hold biased beliefs on the economy and economic policies.
8 The unease with applying rational expectations to uninformed agents goes back to Grossman (1977) 
who puts forward his argument in the context of a financial market model. He claims that informed and 
uninformed agents hold different beliefs in equilibrium, unless there is an observable economic variable, 
which contains the entire information the uninformed agent could otherwise not have observed. In his 
model a price may (or may not) fulfil this role, but in our model there is no such variable.
9 In any case, public goods in the Shi and Svensson model only serve as transfers, just as in this model. 
The main purpose for using public goods is to make the model tractable. Shi and Svensson assume additively- 
separable utility in private and public goods and constant marginal utility on the public goods. Here, we 
only model private consumption, but with a similar constant marginal utility assumption.
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2 T he Basic Political Transfer M odel
In this model, the government can improve its re-election chances by increasing debt-financed 
transfers before elections and cutting transfers to repay the pre-election deficit after elec­
tions. Here are the details of the model. Every second period an incumbent politician and 
a challenger representing different parties run for office. Politicians’ motivation is purely 
opportunistic. Nonetheless, voters’ utility does not hinge on economic considerations alone, 
but also on a more or less strong personal predisposition or sympathy for one of the can- 
didates.10 The utility function for any voter i reflects both  economic and non-economic 
components:
U  =  £  [c. +  a«'z ,\.  (1)
s=t
The economic component cs (consumption) and the sympathy component 9%z s are additively- 
separable with relative weight a  in each period. Discounting between periods could be 
added, but does not contribute to substance nor exposition. Utility derived from sympathy 
is constrained to 9%zs E [— | , | \  since zt is either — 1 (when party a is elected) or +  2 (when 
party b is elected); and the personal sympathy param eter 0% is uniformly distributed over 
the interval [—1 ,1].11 The sympathy component represents any attribu te  of the candidates 
th a t does not affect economic policies, be it their stance on societal issues or their good 
looks. As in Shi and Svensson (2006), there are two kinds of voters. Informed voters (group 
1) observe all variables in the economy, uninformed voters12 (group 2) can only observe a
10 Henceforth the terms voter and individual (agent) are used interchangeably. Similarly, the terms 
politician and policymaker are also used as synonyms. Furthermore, we associate the incumbent with party 
a and the challenger with party b without limiting the generality of the analysis.
11 If individual i has somewhat more sympathies for party a, say at 9l = — 1, then her utility derived 
from sympathy is positive (1), if party a is elected (z = — 2); but it is negative ( — 1), if party b is elected
(zi = 2).
12 It is an implicit assumption in our model that a share of the population shies away from acquiring 
costly information because the losses from being uninformed are too small for them to be concerned about. 
In contrast, Shi and Svensson (2006) suggest that voters are uninformed because of restricted access to 
information.
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subset.13 Both politicians j  =  a,b  face a similar utility function as voters consisting of an 
economic and a non-economic component. The non-economic component is, however, the 
political rent X t th a t policymakers receive from being in power:
V j =  £  [c. +  X , ]. (2)
s=t
Voters’ and politicians’ consumption alike are constrained by each agent’s exogenous net- 
of-tax income y and transfers t t :
ct =  y +  tt. (3)
The government budget constraint is
t t =  Dt — R (D t - 1) +  , (4)
where D measures deficit, R  depicts repayment, and n is the incum bent’s competence. 
Transfers are determined by the policymaker in power.14 They are intertem poral transfers, 
not income redistribution. They allow more government subsidies or benefits. Transfers are 
debt-financed; they depend on deficit minus repayment. (Repayment function R  is assumed 
to be positively sloping and convex with R(0) =  0.) However, the to tal amount of transfers 
also depends on incumbent politician j ’s competence in period t, .15 Competence 
consists of skills shocks for this period and for last period. Each skills shock is a random
13 This is explained at the end of this section. Confer the paragraph on the timing of events on page 9. 
Confer also the different groups in the extended model as distinguished on p.16.
14 Instead of equation (4) a fuller fiscal model could be used, but results are identical. In that case, let 
variable y be gross income and t t depict net transfers, i.e. t t is negative and the absolute value of t t represents 
taxes minus transfers. Taxes would be used to finance a fixed amount of public goods. The question would 
then be: how much can we reduce the tax burden by deficit finance? An example is the discussion about a 
previously abolished commuter tax relief (Pendlerpauschale) in July 2008 in Germany. For obvious political 
reasons some politicians, especially from the Bavarian CSU party, which faced an upcoming election, wanted 
to reintroduce this tax relief at the expense of achieving a balanced budget sooner rather than later.
15 For nj > 0, (net) transfers t t would surpass the net deficit, Dt — R(Dt-1). In a developing country, we 
could interpret nj as the government’s ability to secure foreign aid, which does not have to be repaid. In 
any country, it may also reflect its ability to seize and exploit profitable investment opportunities.
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variable with mean 0, distribution function F (•) and density function f  (•). Past shocks are 
common knowledge, but current or future shocks are unknown to both  policymakers and 
private agents. One-period competence persistence is modeled as an MA(1) process:16
j
(5)
The timing of events is as follows. In period t, the incumbent sets deficit level D t , thus 
providing transfers for the public according to equation (4). Voting individuals observe 
transfer level t t and past skills shock v j- i . Only informed voters observe D t , uninformed 
voters do no t.17 Informed voters can deduce current skills , and can, therefore, extract 
information about the future competence of the incumbent, which the uninformed voters 
cannot. Then, informed and uninformed voters cast their vote based on their different 
information sets. W hat m atters is th a t some voters are imperfectly informed.18 In period 
t +  1, the winner (incumbent or challenger) takes office. Voters are no longer relevant for 
policymakers’ decision making because they cannot vote in period t +  1. Politicians want to 
repay the previous period deficit because the deficit is costly19 and voters cannot sanction 
the policymaker for reducing transfers, i.e. effectively levying additional taxes, to finance
16 Limited persistence is a compromise. It allows some persistence while acknowledging that competence 
also changes over time as new tasks for politicians emerge. For persistence longer than 1 period, the model 
would not be easily solvable. Rogoff’s suggestion of an MA(1) process is one of two conditions for splitting 
the model into separate 2-period cycles (each consisting of an election period and an off-election period) as 
is so common in this literature. Confer the discussion of deficit repayment in the off-election period in the 
following paragraph.
17 Prima facie, it may seem strange that a fraction of voters should be uninformed about the deficit or, 
at least, ignore the deficit in their economic considerations. Since the Maastricht criteria at the latest we 
are used to extensive discussions of deficit levels and deficit reduction strategies, but also to manipulations 
of deficit numbers prior to the start of the European Monetary Union (as mentioned above). Furthermore, 
remember that deficit levels were, at least in many industrial countries, of little concern in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. In developing countries, it is even more obvious that a fraction of society is not informed and/or 
does not incorporate deficit numbers into their economic calculations.
18 Given that the probability of being pivotal is almost zero, there is no incentive for becoming informed 
by gathering costly information in order to improve one’s electoral choice.
19 Repayment is guaranteed, technically, because the marginal utility of additional deficit (through its 
1-for-1 effect on transfers and, finally, on consumption) is 1 (given that the discount factor is 1), whereas 
the marginal cost (R'(D)) and, therefore, the marginal disutility is greater than 1. The unity marginal 
utility assumption is also used by Shi and Svensson (2006) for the same purpose as here, albeit with respect 
to the public goods consumption. -  With less restrictive assumptions, we could get a rising trend in debt.
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deficit repayment. Given th a t voters are only concerned about politicians competence after 
the election it does not m atter th a t individuals anticipate in election period t  tha t politicians 
will repay the deficit in the off-election period t  +  1.
3 Solution of th e Basic M odel
The model is solved in three steps. First, we can determine the probability th a t an individual 
agent votes for the incumbent, to whom we refer as party a , without loss of generality. 
Second and on this basis, we can derive the probability for the incumbent to win the election 
for a given level of transfers, which depend on the deficit level and the competence level of 
the incumbent. Third, we can maximise the incum bent’s expected utility over any 2-period 
cycle, i.e. period t utility plus period t +  1 utility in case of winning the election multiplied 
by the probability of winning (as determined in step 2) plus period t +  1 utility in case of 
losing multiplied by the probability of losing. To characterise the optimal level of deficit we 
derive the first order condition (FOC).
In the first step, we consider an individual voter. She votes for incumbent a, if
E,[c?+i +  a « '( —1)\ >  E,[cJ+i +  a9 i ( + i ) \  - (6)
' ------------------------ v ------------------------ '  ' ------------------------ v ------------------------ '
exp. utility when a in power exp. utility when b in power
Depending on who is in power, t +  1 consumption will typically differ because of differences 
in policymakers’ competence and individuals’ expectations about it:
Et [c?+i\ =  E,[y] +  E,[i?+i]; E ,[4 +i] =  E t [y\+  E t [if+i\; (7)
t t+i =  —R (D t) +  nt+i- (8)
Period t +  1 government budget constraint (8) says th a t the period t deficit must be repaid 
in period t +  1.20 As a result, t + 1  transfers are negative (taxes) corresponding to deficit
20 Remember that policymakers will not borrow in period t + 1 because there is no election at the end of 
that period. Confer the discussion in the paragraph on the timing of events on page 9.
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repayment modulo the effect of the policymaker’s competence. Individuals have no idea 
about the skills shock of either policymaker in t + 1 . Nor do they know the skills shock of 
the challenger in period t. However, they can use the incum bent’s period t deficit policy to 
draw conclusions about her skills shock in period t.
E,[ib+i \ =  —E,[R (D t*)\. (9)
E f t i  \ =  —E,[R (D t* )\+  W  |, (10)
where D^ denotes the incum bent’s optimal period t choice for the deficit (to be determined 
further down). Combining equations (6) to (10) we obtain a condition for an individual to 
vote for incumbent a:
W l  >  aQi . (11)
Using the distribution of the skills shock we can determine the probability (P r) of an 
individual voter, informed or uninformed, to vote for incumbent a:
P r[E t [v?\ — a0 l > 0\ =  E ,W ]  — (—a) =  E2 r L +  1 - <12)a  — (—a) 2a 2
In step 2, we determine the probability Prob  th a t incumbent a obtains 50% of the votes 
in period t elections. It is the probability th a t the number of voters times their individual 
probability P r  to vote for incumbent a (as determined in equation 12) is greater or equal to 
2. However, the individual probability P r  is different for informed and uninformed voters 
because their expectations of period t skills, E t [wt), are different. Let 0 >  a  >  1 depict the 
share of informed voters and ^  =  1 — a  represent the share of uninformed voters. In abuse of 
notation, let us also use a  and ^  as superscripts to distinguish the respective expectations: 
E f  for those by informed voters and E f  for those by uninformed voters. Then we obtain 
the probability for the incumbent to win the election:
^  n I rEt7 [wt 1, , rE f  [u^ U 1 ,Prob < a  [ t LPtJ + - I  +  ^  [ t LPtJ + -I  >  - > .  (13)
' L 2a 2a 2  >  2 '  y J
informed uninformed
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So why is there a difference in expectations for informed and uninformed voters? Consider 
the government budget constraint for period t:
tt =  Dt +  nt (14)
Remember th a t policymakers will not borrow in off-election periods because higher transfers 
and appearing more competent does not affect the duration of the incum bent’s time in 
office. W ithout deficit in off-election period t — 1 there is no repayment in election period 
t. Equation (14) can be rewritten as follows:
nt =  tt — Dt
E f  [w“ ] =  =  t t — D t — w“_i (15)
The point is th a t informed voters can determine E f  [u?\ deterministically, because they can 
observe D t. By contrast, uninformed voters must form an estim ate of the incum bent’s skills, 
V?, based on their estimate for the deficit level, D t :
=  t t — D t — w?_i (16)
or D t =  t t — — w“- i  
V? =  t t — D t — Vt-i + D t — D t (17)
'----------- V----------- '
^  from (15)
E f  w i  =  w? +  d , — d ; (18)
Using equations (15) and (18) we can now determine the probability th a t incumbent a 
receives 50% of the votes in period t:
Prob ( a [  ^  +  1  +  V[W? +  D; — D; +  1  >  1 }
\  2a 2  2a 2  >  2 j
=  Prob ( ^  +  ^ Dt — Dt +  1 >  1 }
I 2a ^  2a 2 >  2 I
12
=  Prob {m? >  V’(Di -  D<)} 
=  1 -  F [ ^ ( S  -  Di)],
(19)
(20)
where F (•) is the distribution function of the skills shock.
In step 3, we can maximise incumbent a ’s utility over the entire election cycle, i.e. periods 
t and t +  1. Period t +  1 utility is the sum of the utilities for winning and losing the election 
weighted by the probability determined in step 2:
m axDt E;{y +  D , +  n? +  X }
+ E ,{  |1 — F [ ^ S  — D;)]] [y — R(D;) +  li+ i +  X\}
'---------------- v---------------- '
prob. incumbent wins 
+E ;{ |F  [ « A  — D;)\\ [y — R (D ,)+  nb+i\} (21)
'-------------v-------------'
prob. incumbent loses
Given th a t the incumbent knows her past, but not her present and future skills (and not 
the skills shock of the challenger) the maximisation problem looks as follows:
m axDi y +  D , +  w?- i  +  X
+y — R (D t)
+  [1 — F  [^ (A  — D t^ X  (22)
Differentiation with respect to D t produces a FOC, which allows us to determine the gov-
ernm ent’s optimal deficit D
1 — R '(D t*) +  ^ F , [^(Dt — D t*)\X =  0, (23)
where F ' (•) =  f  (•) refers to the probability density function. 1 — R '(D t*) is the marginal 
direct net effect of deficit, which is negative, because deficit including repayment is costly.
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Deficit is optimally chosen by the government, when the negative marginal direct net effect 
equals the positive marginal effect on the expected ego rent. This is the impact of a marginal 
change of deficit on competence and, thereby, on the probability of receiving the ego rent, 
multiplied by the ego rent.
W ith uninformed voters forming rational expectations (as discussed above) D* =  D t and 
the FOC becomes
1 +  * ƒ  [0\X =  R  (D*) (24)
Applying to tal differentials to the FOC tells us what affects the optimal level of borrowing. 
The following proposition captures the perturbation results with respect to the political rent 
X  and the share of uninformed voters *.
P rop osition  1 - Ego Rent and Uninformed Voters in the Basic Model.
In  the basic transfer model with rational expectations by all agents higher political rents and 
a larger share o f uninform ed voters increase optimal borrowing at the equilibrium:
dD* dD*
(i) d T  >  0 (ii) > 0-
Intuitively, if the ego rent of being in power increases, then the incentive to distort the 
economy also increases. The incumbent is more willing to incur the costs for increasing the 
deficit in order to appear more competent in the eye of voters. Furthermore, increasing the 
share of uninformed voters increases the efficiency of electioneering because more voters can 
be fooled before elections.
4 T he E xtended P olitica l Transfer and D isinform ation M odel
The government has now got a disinformation instrum ent to improve re-election chances: 
it can invest in propaganda and, thereby, influence the perception of those voters who
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are uninformed about the level of deficit manipulations. Including such a disinformation 
technology does not change the basic model setup or the timing of events. However, the 
government budget constraint for period t21 becomes
tt =  D t — Ct +  n^ (25)
where C  depicts the cost of the propaganda campaign. Disinformation investment Ct >  0 
has a direct effect on the perception of the deficit by those voters who are uninformed 
about the deficit. We thus relinquish the rational expectations assumption for voters who 
are uninformed about the deficit and postulate the following function to determine their 
perceived level of deficit:
D  :=  Dt =  D(Ct), (26)
with D '(C t) <  0 and D ''(C t) >  0, i.e. disinformation is effective and reduces the perceived 
deficit, but with a decreasing marginal effect. The government has thus full control over D t , 
the level of deficit as perceived by voters who are uninformed about the deficit in election 
period t. The government’s costs Ct are determined according to disinformation technology 
(26). We suggest some additional plausible assumptions to obtain unambiguous results. 
We restrict the possible values of D (C t): D(0) <  D* (even without disinformation is the 
perceived level always smaller than  the equilbium level) and D (ro) >  0 (disinformation 
cannot make uninformed voters belief in a surplus instead of a deficit). In the same vein, we 
also postulate some minor restrictions on the distribution of the (incumbent’s) skills shock. 
We want the distribution of competence to be bell-shaped or at least F''(w? <  0) >  0, 
i.e. competence below average becomes less and less likely the further one moves away 
from the average (w? =  0). The limiting case of F''(w? <  0) =  0 (which is more general 
than  assuming an equal distribution throughout) can also be accepted. Having a second 
instrum ent raises the question of how well voters are informed about the government’s choice
21 The period t + 1 constraint does not have to be changed because there are no elections and the 
government is not concerned about voters and their perception.
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of disinformation investment Ct . A similar assumption as for the deficit is made (below). 
Some private agents are informed, some are not informed about government propaganda and 
have to form expectations thereof. The following four groups of voters are distinguished and 
their expectations of the incum bent’s skills can be derived in analogy to equations (15) and 
(18):
• informed about propaganda (group A):
— and informed about deficit (group A1):
E f  [w“ \ =  w“ =  t t — D t — w?-i (27) 
(This corresponds to equation 15 of the basic model.)
— but un informed about deficit (group A2):
E f  [w?l =  w? +  (D; — S )  (28)
(This corresponds to equation 18 of the basic model.)
• un informed about propaganda (group B):
— but informed about deficit (group B1):
ET [w? \ =  w? +  (S t — Ct) (29)
— and un informed about deficit (group B2):
E f [w? \ =  w? +  (D, — S ) +  (Ci — C t). (30)
It remains to clarify how the perceived level of disinformation costs, Ct, is determined. 
Remember tha t it applies only to those voters who are uninformed about the level of Ct . 
To keep the model simple and still fairly general, we postulate th a t uninformed voters are 
typically not fully rational, but have an idea of how much the government manipulates their
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perception:2223
On this basis, the probability th a t incumbent a receives 50% of the votes in period t is 
obtained as
Prob | w? >  (*  +  C)(D  — D t) +  +  e)(C t — Ct)} (32)
=  1 — f  [ ( * + e ) ( D —D, ) +  (W+ e ) (c , — a ) ) .  (33)
C  =  kC,, 0 < k < 1. (31)
Figure 1: Bell-shaped competence density function
The marked area (dark grey or red [if in colour]) towards the right of the density function 
depicted in figure 1 corresponds to the probability described by equation (32) and by the 
distribution function representation in equation (33). For illustration purposes, assume 
Ct =  Ct , i.e. k =  1, for the moment (confer the discussion in footnote 22 and the assumptions 
specified in footnote 24). In th a t case, the expected competence overall (combine equations 
27 to 30) is always greater than  the actual competence given tha t D <  D t (according
22 Many complications are feasible, but none of them contributes to the main trust of this paper or the 
understanding of its qualitative results. It is no problem to include the rational expectations case, i.e. to 
impose the equilibrium condition Ct = C* after optimisation (which is conceptually different to setting k =1  
in equation 31). It would also be possible to discuss a society, which is overly sceptical towards propaganda 
by its leaders, i.e. k > 1. As a result, the perturbation result in proposition 7 would become ambiguous, 
i.e. could potentially change signs. More complex, but also no real problem would be to consider some 
interaction term for voters who are uninformed with respect to both deficit and disinformation.
23 Note also that there is a real world difference in the magnitude of (rather large) actual and perceived 
deficit on the one hand and (rather small) actual and perceived costs of disinformation. This allows us to 
make the assumption (Dt — D) + (Ct — Ct) > 0, although Dt — D > 0, but Ct — Ct < 0.
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to the assumptions about the effect of disinformation on the deficit perception made for 
equation 26). By implication, the probability (confer equation (33) or the dark grey [or 
red\ area under the density function) is always greater than  2. We can see th a t producing 
or increasing a deficit (or reducing D, the perception thereof) increases the government’s 
chance to be re-elected. This was not so in the basic model of section 2 because Dt and D 
are always linked and identical in equilibrium. In th a t model, the incumbent would produce 
a deficit cycle for political reasons (due to the existence of uninformed voters), but she would 
be unable to improve her re-election chances in equilibrium because the critical competence 
value remains at 0 when applying the rational expectations assumption.
In the extended political transfer and disinformation model the incum bent’s maximisation 
problem looks as follows:
maxDt,ct y +  D , — C, +  w?- i +  X  
+ y  — R (D t)
+  [1 — F  [(* +  e)(S  — Dt) +  (w +  e)(Ci — S t f lX  (34)
Having verified the second order conditions for a well-behaved maximistion problem24 we 
can focus on the now two FOCs:
1 — r ' ( d * ) +  ( * + e) f ' [ ( * + e)(S —Dt) +  ( w+ e) (c ,  — c ^ x  =  0 , (35) 
—1 — [(W+ e) +  ( * + o D ' i f ' k * + e)(S —d , )  +  ( w+ e) (c ,  — c ^ x  =  0 . (36)
The interpretation of the first FOC is unchanged to the FOC of the basic model: the 
negative marginal direct net effect equals the positive marginal effect (through competence) 
on the expected ego rent. The second FOC is similar with two differences: (i), the negative
24 We only need three not very restrictive assumptions for this and for all propositions. The assumptions 
have to do with the relative size of propaganda investment and the much larger deficit as well as deficit and 
propaganda perceptions: (i) (^ + £)(D — Dt) + (w + £)(Ct — Ct) < 0; (ii) (D — Dt) + (Ct — Ct) < 0; and 
(iii) D ' < —1 (a $1 investment reduces the perception of the deficit by more than $1).
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marginal direct effect equals minus unity and relates to the costs incurred in the pre-election 
period only; and (ii), the positive indirect effect through competence now depends on A := 
(w +  e) +  C0 +  e)D '. From the second FOC we can determine tha t A must be negative: 
a marginal increase in C  increases the critical value of the density function by w +  e, but 
the effect is more than  outweighed by the decrease of the critical value through its effect 
on perceived deficit, (^  +  e)D '. One other thing we can learn from FOC (36): it is always 
optimal for the government to use disinformation for reducing the perceived level of deficit 
(as long as ^  >  0), even if the public is fully aware of the investment in propaganda, i.e. 
nobody is uninformed about propaganda (w =  e =  0).
5 R esu lts and D iscussion
For obtaining perturbation results the Implicit Function Theorem is used. We are interested 
in marginal effects either of changes in the political rent X  or of shifts between groups of 
voters on  the government’s optimal choice both of the deficit Dt and of its investment in 
propaganda Ct .
P rop osition  2 - Ego Rent.
Higher political rents increase optimal borrowing and disinform ation investm ent at the equi­
librium:
. . dD* dC*
(i) d X  >  0 (ii) d X  >
This confirms and straightforwardly extends proposition 1 (i): a higher ego rent increases the 
incentive to distort the economy by raising the deficit, but also by stepping up propaganda 
in order to reduce the deficit perception of voters who are uninformed about the deficit. 
As the ego rent increases, both instrum ents are used by the incumbent to appear more 
competent in the eye of voters.
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In principle, the comparison of the extended model to the basic model becomes slightly more 
complicated when considering shifts between groups because we are comparing a model with
2 groups of voters to one with 4 groups of voters.25 Increasing the share of one group does 
not imply the reduction of a particular other group. Instead, we have to specify which group 
size is reduced. Nonetheless, for propositions 3 to 5, it only m atters, if voters shift from 
being informed (group A1 or B1) to being uninformed about the deficit (group A2 or B2), 
irrespective of whether they are informed about disinformation costs or not.
P rop osition  3 - Deficit W hen Uninformed About the Deficit.
A larger share o f voters who are uninform ed about the deficit increases optimal borrowing 
at the equilibrium only, i f  the density function  is (relatively) fla t (i.e. F " close or equal to 
0) at the equilibrium:
dD* dD*
(i) >  0 (ii) - d r  >
Proposition 1 (ii) is not guaranteed to carry over to the extended model, only if the density 
function is (relatively) flat. In the basic model, the argument was th a t more voters can 
be fooled before elections. Now, increasing the share of uninformed voters does not neces­
sarily increase the efficiency of electioneering.26 Prim a facie, this result appears puzzling 
and is, therefore, discussed after the next proposition, which presents a similar result for 
disinformation:
25 To conceptualise what is going on it helps to envisage a 50-50 split between informed (group 1) and 
uninformed (group 2) voters in the basic model. When we move to the extended model, we could postulate 
that half of those voters who are uninformed about the deficit are informed about the incumbent’s disinfor­
mation (25% overall), the others not (25%). We could do the same for the voters who are informed about 
the deficit. As a result, we would compare the basic model with 2 equal groups (1 and 2) to the extended 
model with 4 equal groups (A1, A2, B1, B2).
26 This result actually applies to all four possible marginal changes between groups. To be precise,
proposition 3 (i) represents a marginal change from group A1 to A2 and is captured by --- , which
equals ^j-- because = 0. Proposition 3 (ii) depicts the marginal change from group A1 to B2. We
could add the marginal changes from groups B1 to A2 ( D^---- ^D-) or B1 to B2 ( ---- ^D-), but in each
case we obtain the same qualitative result.
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P rop osition  4 - Disinformation When Uninformed About the Deficit.
A larger share o f voters who are uninform ed about the deficit increases optimal investm ent 
in disinform ation at the equilibrium, i f  the density function  is (relatively) fla t (i.e. F "  close 
or equal to 0) at the equilibrium:
, , dC * , , dC *
(i) 1 /  > 0 (ii) - d ~  > 0
The underlying reason for propositions 3 and 4 can be illustrated analytically and graphi­
cally. Decreasing the number of voters who are informed about the deficit marginally (i.e. 
considering d /  >  0 or d£ >  0) means th a t the incum bent’s probability of winning the elec­
tions goes up marginally according to equation (32), which is repeated here for convenience:
Prob >  ( /  +  C)(D — D t) +  (w +  C)(Ct — C<i) } • (32)
This is illustrated in figure 2 by shifting the critical value for to the left (as indicated by 
the arrow):
Figure 2: Deficit and propaganda further increases the probability to win
W ith the marginal increase of the share of voters who are uninformed about the deficit (i.e. 
increasing ^  or e), marginally raising D t or reducing D is now potentially more effective 
according to equation (32) and could be used for further increasing the probability to win,
i.e. for further shifting the critical value to the left. However, the gain in probability to 
win could also be used to ease the burden of (i.e. costs for) disinformation and /or deficit. 
W hat is optimal for the incumbent depends on the strength of those countervailing effects.
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Raising D t is costly because R (D t) >  D t must be repaid in the off-election period. Lowering 
D can only be achieved by increasing the propaganda cost Ct, which lowers the probability 
of winning according to equation (32). W hen the density function is relatively flat (as in 
figure 2), the additional probability mass to be gained from raising D t or reducing D as a 
response to the increase in ^  (or e) is rather large. However, it can be smaller when the 
slope is greater at the equilibrium as illustrated by figure 3. Then the utility gain for the 
incumbent caused by a further increase in probability to win (due to higher D t or lower D) 
might be offset by the aforementioned countervailing effects.
Figure 3: Deficit and propaganda may or may not further raise probability to win
In the la tte r case, a marginal increase of /  or £ (share of voters who are uninformed about 
the deficit) may produce the opposite result for deficit2728 as described by
P rop osition  5 - Deficit W hen Uninformed About the Deficit - The O ther Case.
A larger share o f voters who are uninform ed about the deficit decreases optimal borrowing 
at the equilibrium, i f  the density function  is sufficiently steep at the equilibrium:
dD* dD*
(i) —  <  0 &  —  <
27 Note that proposition 5 only applies for a sufficiently large slope of the density function at the equilib­
rium. The slope is, of course, determined endogenously.
28 Again, what matters is that the shift is to a group, which is uninformed about the deficit. This includes 
not only shifts from A1 to A2 and A1 to B2, but also B1 to A2 and B1 to B2. In contrast, the results for 
propaganda costs are not so clear-cut. Conditions for optimal disinformation to be reduced in response to 
an increase in the number of voters who are uninformed about the deficit are very restrictive.
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To understand the results on a more intuitive level, consider, once again, the difference of 
the density functions depicted in figures 2 and 3.29 If the actual competence distribution 
corresponds to the density function depicted in figure 3, the incumbent knows th a t her 
competence is probably pretty  close to the average (even though she does, of course, not 
know the exact level of her competence according to the basic assumption made in section 
2). In this case, the incumbent does not gain a great deal from appearing more competent 
since the probability of winning cannot be increased much by shifting the critical value to 
the left. W ith ^  or e marginally increased, marginally raising the deficit or reducing the 
perceived deficit are potentially more effective according to equation equation (32), but it 
need not be beneficial overall. Instead, the incumbent may be better off reducing the costly 
disinformation and /o r deficit manipulations. Hence proposition 5 (if the slope is steep 
enough at the equilibrium). If the density function is, however, relatively flat as in figure
2, the incum bent’s competence distribution has a fat tail and there is a good chance tha t 
the incumbent is relatively far away from average competence. (The extreme case would be 
an equal distribution of competence, at least on the side of below-average competence.) In 
this situation, the incumbent tries to exploit any possibility for appearing more competent 
despite the countervailing costs. Hence propositions 3 and 4.
Compared to the basic model, proposition 5 is the m ajor finding of this paper. It results 
from extending the model to disinformation and, thereby, avoiding the rational expectations 
assumption for voters who are uninformed about the deficit. The share of voters who are 
uninformed about disinformation does not seem to m atter. However, proposition 6 states 
th a t the negative result of proposition 5 is strengthened with the number of voters who are 
uninformed about government propaganda.
P rop osition  6 - Deficit W hen Uninformed About the Deficit - More On the O ther Case. 
Given the situation o f proposition 5 (sufficiently steep density function), the decrease of 
optimal borrowing (caused by an increased share o f voters who are uninform ed about the
29 Over a large range, the slopes on the left branch of the density function of figure 3 are greater than at 
any point of the left branch of the figure 2 density function.
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deficit) is augmented when the share o f voters who are uninform ed about disinform ation  
increases at the equilibrium:
d ^ rf  d ^
(i) <  0 (ii) <  0 fo r  x =  w,£.
dx dx
How can we explain proposition 6? Voters who are uninformed about disinformation costs 
do not know how much the government invests in propaganda and underestim ate the gov­
ernm ent’s costs for it. Ignoring an additional burden on the budget means th a t they expect 
higher transfers than  realistically possible. They are disappointed about low levels of trans­
fers and conclude th a t the government must be less competent than  it actually is. This 
reduces the government’s probability to win the elections. W ith more voters who are unin­
formed about disinformation costs, it is costlier for the government to invest in propaganda 
in order to reduce the perceived deficit. Now, let us look at proposition 6 again. The 
potential gain from increasing the deficit (caused by an increased share of voters who are 
uninformed about the deficit) faces larger countervailing costs. Hence the government will 
not only not increase (when the density function is sufficiently steep), but decrease optimal 
deficit more vigorously.
The last proposition looks at the direct effect of the share of voters who are uninformed 
about disinformation costs:
P rop osition  7 - W hen Uninformed About Disinformation.
A larger share o f voters who are uninform ed about disinform ation costs increases the optimal 
deficit, but decreases the optimal investm ent in disinform ation at the equilibrium:
. . dD* dC*
(i) 4 7  >  0 (ii) d J  <  0-
Proposition 7 (ii) can be explained along the lines of our explanation for proposition 6. More 
voters (who are uninformed about disinformation costs) conclude th a t the government is 
less competent. Disinformation becomes costlier and is reduced by the government in the
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optimum. However, less disinformation means higher perceived deficit. To counterbalance 
part of the effect, the government finds it optimal to increase the deficit. Hence proposition 
7(i) .
6 C onclusion
This paper argues th a t governments, which engage in economic manipulations do a fortiori 
engage in political manipulations. In particular, there is evidence th a t governments will 
try  to obscure their fiscal manipulations. We consider a disinformation technology within 
a political budget cycle model: transfer and deficit manipulations are complemented by 
government disinformation policies on the deficit. The less informed part of society will 
perceive the deficit level and /or the costs for disinformation below the level chosen by a 
utility maximising government. Although the government does not know its own compe­
tence, it will try  to raise its re-election chance by appearing more competent. This can be 
achieved by increasing deficit-financed transfers and /or by reducing the perceived deficit 
through increased propaganda. As a result, budget and deficit cycles emerge. Cycles in­
crease with politicians’ exogenous ego rents, but may increase or decrease with the share of 
voters who are uninformed about the level of deficit.
Prim a facie, it would seem more intuitive, if an increase of the share of uninformed voters 
unambiguously increased a government’s optimal level of deficit. This is the result we do 
actually obtain, if we do not consider disinformation, but assume rational expectations of 
the deficit level by uninformed voters instead. This result is confirmed by Shi and Svensson 
(2006). W ith disinformation included, this seemingly intuitive result does no longer hold 
unambiguously. It is still a possible outcome, but only if potential realisations of govern­
ment competence are very dispersed. In this case, increasing propaganda and debt-financed 
transfers allow an incumbent to appear competent for many more realisations of low com­
petence. The government will then forego the costs of manipulations: higher repayment 
costs for increasing deficit or higher propaganda costs for lowering the perceived deficit.
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In contrast, if the competence distribution is more compressed towards the average, fewer 
realisations of low competence can be affected by appearing more competent. In this case, 
the incumbent may use the improvement of re-election chances (due to the increase of the 
share of voters who are uninformed about the deficit) for reducing costly manipulations.
Moreover, it can be shown th a t the deficit reduction (in case of dispersed competence) is 
more substantial, if the share of voters who are uninformed about disinformation costs is 
increased. Voters who are uninformed about disinformation costs do not know how much 
the government invests in propaganda. They observe a relatively low level of transfers and 
conclude th a t the government must be less competent than  it actually is. Increasing the 
deficit would still be more effective (due to the increased share of voters who are uninformed 
about the deficit), but it faces even larger countervailing costs. Hence the government will 
decrease optimal deficit even more vigorously. A different result is obtained, if we study the 
direct effect of a change of the share of voters who are uninformed about the disinformation 
(when there is no change in the share of voters who are uninformed about the deficit). These 
voters will also conclude th a t the government must be less competent, but here the situation 
is much simpler. The government finds it optimal to shift the emphasis from disinformation 
to deficit (with deficit and perceived deficit jointly increasing).
The main finding of this paper is th a t the straightforward link between more voters, who are 
uninformed about the deficit, and increased budget and deficit cycles is too straightforward 
and does no longer hold in a broader model. The existence of this link hinges on the 
government’s incentive to appear competent, which is shown in this paper to depend on 
the distribution of competence. This is relevant for policy and for empirical research. A 
stereotype developing country has typically got governments exhibiting very diverse skills 
and abilities. Such a country can be characterised by a dispersed competence distribution. 
In this case, reducing the share of uninformed voters would help alleviate the budget cycle. 
In a stereotype industrial country the situation is different. Government competence is 
typically less dispersed. In this case, increasing information need not lead to a reduction 
of the budget cycle. Reducing the share of uninformed voters may actually exacerbate the
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problem of political budget cycles. Conversely, a large share of uninformed voters in a 
developed country may concur with smaller budget cycles. This has empirical implications. 
For instance, if we believe tha t in industrial countries the share of voters who are informed 
about the deficit is actually not so high, this may explain why the budget cycle is found 
by Block (2002), Schuknecht (1996 and 2000), Shi and Svensson (2006), and Vergne (2009) 
to be more relevant in developing countries. Shi and Svensson’s (theoretical) explanation is 
th a t the larger share of uninformed voters in developing countries produces larger budget 
cycles. Thus we offer an alternative explanation for the same phenomenon. Even if the 
share of voters who are uninformed about the deficit were the same, developing countries 
could still exhibit larger budget cycles because of more dispersed government competence.
This paper evokes at least two possible extensions. First, an effort could be made to test 
our empirical predictions. If competence is really dispersed in developing countries, third 
world countries with a higher share of voters who are un informed about the deficit should 
exhibit larger budget cycles compared to other developing countries. Conversely for (indus­
trial) countries with less dispersed competence, if such a (developed) country has a large 
share of in  formed voters, it may experience larger cycles than  a comparable country with 
less informed voters. The difficulty would be to find good proxies or instruments. Maybe, 
the dispersion of government competence, the government skills shocks, could be instru­
mented with capital flight or another financial variable; the share of informed voters might 
be captured by literacy, economic freedom or a freedom of the press variable. Second, dis­
information and uninformed voters could be included in a signalling model of the Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (2000) type, where the government observes the competence 
prior to private agents. The interaction (’’lying” ) between informed and uninformed agents 
captured in models of strategic communication (such as Kartik, 2009) could be applied to 
the interaction between the government and uninformed private agents. It would be inter­
esting to see, if our ambiguous result about the effect of the share of uninformed voters on 
the deficit cycle obtains when disinformation is incorporated in such a signalling model of 
the political budget cycle.
27
R eferences
A kerlof, G. A., and J. L. Yellen (1985): A Near-rational Model of the Business Cycle, with 
Wage and Price Inertia, Quarterly Journal o f Econom ics 100:5, 823-38.
A lesina , A., G. D. Cohen, and N. Roubini (1992): Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in 
OECD Democracies, Econom ics and Politics 4, 1-30.
A lesina , A., G. D. Cohen, and N. Roubini (1993): Electoral Business Cycles in Industrial 
Democracies, European Journal o f Political Econom y  9, 1-25.
A lesina , A. and N. Roubini (1990): Political cycles in OECD Economies, Review of Eco­
nom ic Studies 59, 663-688.
A lt, J. E., and K. A. Chrystal (1983), Political economics (University of California Press: 
Berkeley).
A u s te n -S m ith , D. (1987): Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions, and Probabilistic 
Voting, Public Choice 54, 123-139.
B lock, S. A. (2002): Political Business Cycles, Democratization, and Economic Reform: 
The Case of Africa, Journal o f D evelopment Econom ics 67:1, 205-28.
C ap lan , B. (2002): Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics: Robust Evidence of 
Judgmental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, 
Econom ic Journal 112:479, 433-58.
C ap lan , B. (2006): How Do Voters Form Positive Economic Beliefs? Evidence from the 
Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, Public Choice 128: 3-4, 367-381. 
D razen , A. (2001): The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years, in: B. S.Bernanke and K. 
Rogoff (eds.), N B E R  macroeconomics annual 2000, volume 15 (MIT Press: Cambridge and 
London), 75-117.
F au st, J., and and J. S. Irons (1999): Money, Politics and the Post-W ar Business Cycle, 
Journal o f M onetary Econom ics 43:1, 61-89.
G ro ssm an , S. J. (1977): The Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations 
and Informational Externalities, Review o f Econom ic Studies 44, 431-449.
H e in em a n n , F. (2006): Planning or Propaganda? An Evaluation of Germany’s Medium­
term  Budgetary Planning, FinanzArchiv  62, 551-578.
K a r tik , N. (2009): Strategic Communication with Lying Costs, Review o f Econom ic Studies 
76, 1359-1395.
M an k iw , N. G., and R. Reis (2002): Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal 
to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, Quarterly Journal o f Econom ics 117:4, 1295­
1328.
M itch e ll, D. J. (1991): The Results are in on the 1990 Budget Agreement, Backgrounder 
842, The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.
28
N o rd h a u s , W. D. (1975): The Political Business Cycle, Review o f Econom ic Studies 42:2, 
169-90.
P o r r i t t ,  E. (1910): The Struggle over the Lloyd-George Budget, Quarterly Journal of 
Econom ics 24:2, 243-278.
Rogoff, K. (1990): Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, Am erican Econom ic Review  80, 
21-36.”
Rogoff, K., and A. Sibert (1988): Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles, Review of 
Econom ic Studies 55:1, 1-16.
S ch u k n ech t, L. (1996): Political Business Cycles and Fiscal Policies in Developing Coun­
tries, Kyklos 49:2, 155-170.
S ch u k n ech t, L. (2000): Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Coun­
tries, Public Choice 102:1-2, 115-130.
Shi, M. and J. Svensson (2006): Political Budget Cycles: Do They Differ across Countries 
and Why?, Journal o f Public Econom ics 90:8-9, 1367-89.
U rsp ru n g , T. (1994): The Use and Effect of Political Propaganda in Democracies, Public 
Choice 78, 259-282.
V ergne, C. (2009): Democracy, Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditures in Devel­
oping Countries, European Journal o f Political Econom y  25:1, 63-77.
29
